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ABSTRACT Just after the end of the Soviet Union and the emergence of 
three independent states in the South Caucasus Turkey started to 
manifest a real interest for this region. Energy issue, which is the 
key issue in this Turkish policy since the beginning, is expected to 
remain the key priority for Turkey because of its growing econo-
my. Ankara tries to have a balanced relations with the three South 
Caucasian countries, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, but for 
multiple reasons, Turkey’s policy in the South Caucasus is still de-
termined by its relations with Azerbaijan who is the best ally and 
economic partner for Ankara.
Turkey, despite being an imme-diate neighbor of the South Caucasus or Caucasian coun-
tries and having a shared history 
because of the Ottoman domination 
of this region, has only recently ex-
pressed an interest and developed 
a foreign policy towards the three 
South Caucasus republics. Since their 
accession to independence in 1991, 
Ankara has established unique ties 
with these nations. However, Turkey 
is not the only regional power to be 
looking into its neighborhood. Two 
other neighbors, which have also his-
torically dominated this region, are 
manifesting a likewise legitimate in-
terest: Russia and Iran. In fact, with 
the end of the Soviet Union, the new 
geographical configuration in the 
area fed the expectation that a new 
struggle for influence in this region 
would soon be revived amongst the 
old empires: the Russians, the Sa-
favids, and the Ottomans and their 
heirs, Russia, Iran, and Turkey. But 
this confrontation has not taken 
place. To date, political pragmatism 
and economic cooperation have 
prevailed. In particular, Turkey and 
Russia have succeeded in avoiding 
all direct conflict in the affairs of the 
Southern Caucasus. Still, they can be 
considered the sources of polariza-
tion in conflicts, such as the conflict 
in the Nagorno-Karabakh or the se-
cessionist movement in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia in Georgia. 
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A General Perspective of Turkey’s 
Foreign Policy in the Southern 
Caucasus
The end of the bipolar world was a 
watershed moment in the history of 
Turkey’s foreign policy. No longer 
having to serve the role of the buffer 
zone between East and West, Turkey 
aspires to become a major political 
actor and to impose itself on the re-
gional scene in the post-Soviet era. 
The Turkic republics of the area are 
of particular importance to Turkey. 
In the heart of the Caucasus stands 
Azerbaijan, culturally and political-
ly the closest to Turkey. Fearful that 
this new region would fall under the 
influence of countries hostile to the 
West, like Iran or Saudi Arabia, or 
to avoid a return of Russia, Turkey’s 
western allies strongly encouraged 
Ankara to present itself as a model 
of secular development. However, for 
a multitude of reasons, including a 
lack of sufficient resources, the reti-
cence of these newly formed repub-
lics to relinquish their sovereignty in 
exchange for an outside model, and 
their apprehension of Russia’s return 
to its “old neighborhood,” Ankara 
has revisited its far sighted ambi-
tions and returned to a more realistic 
approach.1
When the AK Party acceded to power 
in 2002, it put into place a more as-
sertive foreign policy largely due to 
the economic miracle of the “Anato-
lian Tigers.” At the same time, Turkey 
was cautious not to be overly ambi-
tious in the Caucasus to avoid stir-
ring up trouble and rubbing Russia 
the wrong way. As it turned out, the 
results were mixed, and even disap-
pointing politically, however there 
was success in the economic and cul-
tural spheres. Turkey’s priority was 
in the area of energy and its partici-
pation in the realization of the “proj-
ect of the century,” the construction 
of the Baku, Tbilisi, Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline. Following long and intense 
negotiations and political maneuver-
ing, in 2005, the BTC turned Turkey 
into a key country for the transit of 
hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea 
to European markets2. The BTC was 
extended by the Baku, Tbilisi, and 
Erzurum pipeline for the transport 
of natural gas. This very pipeline is in 
the process of being further extended 
by the construction of two new pipe-
lines that are underway: TAP and 
TANAP, respectively the Trans Adri-
atic Pipeline and the Trans Anatolian 
Pipeline. Once completed, they will 
allow for an improved transit of gas 
from the Caspian Sea to the Markets 
of Europe – passing though Georgia, 
Turkey, Albania, Greece, and Italy. By 
reducing European dependence on 
Russian natural gas, these pipelines 
will turn Turkey into an energy hub 
and a major actor for exchanges be-
tween Europe and the Caspian basin3.
Politically and geo-strategically, Tur-
key is still not the major actor its for-
eign policy architects dreamt of be-
ing at the end of the Soviet era. Two 
events illustrate this current failure 
in Turkey’s foreign policy ambitions 
and have forced it to be more modest. 
First, as a close ally to Azerbaijan, Tur-
key did little to help resolve the con-
flict in the Nagorno-Karabakh. The 
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Minsk group, which did not include 
Turkey and had the mission to pro-
mote the advancement of the peace 
negotiations between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, produced little in accom-
plishing any significant improvement 
in a conflict that has been frozen for 
over twenty years. Second, the short 
war in the summer of 2008 between 
Russian and Georgia also revealed 
Turkey’s political effacement in the 
Southern Caucasus. Having normally 
good relations with both Russia and 
Georgia, Turkey attempted to play a 
mediation role in the conflict but rap-
idly became aware that it was ineffec-
tive. Confronted by Russia’s growing 
ambitions, Turkey has little leverage, 
especially in the Southern Caucasus. 
Thus, Ankara launched the “Cauca-
sus Stability and Cooperation Plat-
form,” which brought together the 
three Caucasus Republics, Turkey, 
and Russia. Unfortunately, these ef-
forts only revealed Turkey’s position 
of inferiority in relation to Russia in 
this region.4 Most recently, in March 
2014, Ankara has felt its impotency in 
the region following Russia’s annex-
ation of Crimea. Turkey’s diplomats 
were forced to curtail their criticism 
of this act to avoid all direct confron-
tation with a major economic part-
ner: Russia.5
However, when it comes to “soft pow-
er,” Turkey has considerable influence 
in the Southern Caucasus. Turkey’s 
television broadcasts of shows and 
programs are exceptionally popular 
in Azerbaijan. Reciprocal tourism is 
flourishing between Turkey and the 
Caucasus. Turkish religious influence 
is notable, not only in Azerbaijan but 
also in the Muslim regions of Georgia 
(in the region of Adjara and the bor-
der areas of Azerbaijan). Indirectly 
linked to this soft power are the cul-
tural and educational activities of the 
Gulenist movement, which reaches 
both Azerbaijan and Georgia where 
five schools and one university have 
been established. However, since an 
open political rift has erupted in Tur-
key between Prime Minister Erdogan 
and Fethullah Gülen (the spiritual 
leader of the Gulenist movement), 
serious repercussions could emerge 
in the region, especially in Azerbai-
jan where the Gülen movement af-
filiated activities have already been 
severely scrutinized by local author-
ities. Nevertheless, it is undeniable 
that a generation of political elites has 
been formed because of these educa-
tional establishments created by the 
Gülenist movement. Still, despite the 
State University of Yerevan opening 
of a Department of Turkish Studies 
with more than 200 students study-
ing Turkish language and civilization, 
soft power in Armenia remains weak. 
There are evident disparities in the 
bilateral relations between Turkey 
and each of these Republics of the 
Southern Caucasus. Each of these 
three countries has striking differ-
ences. More importantly, they each 
Turkey and Russia have 
succeeded in avoiding all 
direct conflict in the affairs of 
the Southern Caucasus
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represent diverse interests for Tur-
key. Thus, they each have taken on 
a unique place in Ankara’s foreign 
policy. 
Turkey-Azerbaijan, a Quasi-
perfect Convergence of 
Viewpoints and Interests in the 
Southern Caucasus
Azerbaijan holds a unique place in 
Turkey’s foreign policy, not only 
in the Caucasus and in the general 
Turkic speaking region but also be-
yond. This closeness is not only due 
to the shared cultural and linguistic 
affinities but also to the strong polit-
ical and strategic interests that exist 
between these two countries. Their 
bilateral relations are often character-
ized as “two states, one nation.” With 
the end of the Soviet Empire, Turkey 
sought to recreate a solidarity based 
on “Turkishness,” connecting all 
Turkish-speaking nations. Azerbaijan 
was the most enthusiastic in heeding 
this call. Good bilateral relations are 
not limited to official government 
interactions, as the two societies are 
very close and intertwined culturally. 
Many Turks are of Azerbaijani ori-
gin, and since the end of the Soviet 
era, there is an increasing number of 
marriages between Turks and Aze-
ris. Ethnically, these two people are 
almost identical. This is true to the 
extent that religious differences are 
erased, as Turkey is a Sunni majority 
country and Azerbaijan is 65% Shiite. 
All these factors explain the gener-
ally good relations between Turkey 
and Azerbaijan; however, they do not 
mask certain emerging tensions. 
At the beginning of Azerbaijan’s in-
dependence, relations were warm 
between the two countries. The 
first President of Azerbaijan, Abul-
faz Elchibey, was known for his 
Pan-Turkism and his strong attach-
ment to Turkey. However, in 1993, he 
was overthrown by a coup d’état and 
was replaced by Heydar Aliyev, who 
put in place a more pragmatic foreign 
policy that was less tied to Turkey. Still, 
he maintained good relations with 
Ankara. Since 2003, his son Ilham has 
followed a similar political line and 
has been able to manage Azerbaijan’s 
neighbors. Concretely, Turkey has ac-
tively supported Azerbaijan’s position 
in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as 
well as other regional security issues; 
for example, when tensions emerged 
between Azerbaijan and Iran.6 In ex-
change, Azerbaijan supports Turkey’s 
initiatives, like the Turcophone Sum-
mits, even if these summits are not 
met with much enthusiasm in Central 
Asia. In sum, Turkey and Azerbaijan 
share similar positions on the Arme-
nian question of genocide, conflict in 
the Nagorno-Karabakh, and regional 
security issues. 
In terms of economics, the two coun-
tries are linked through a multiplicity 
of accords, which permit exchang-
es in all sectors, however the energy 
section is by far the most dynamic. 
A number of Turkish companies are 
investing in Azerbaijan, but the BTC, 
the BTE and the other pipelines that 
are under construction, like the TAP 
and the TANAP, represent the keys to 
relations between these two counties, 
and even their future. Moreover, pet-
rol revenues have permitted Azerbai-
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jan to massively invest in the Turkish 
economy.7
In the area of ideas, relations are even 
more developed and have history. 
The Turkish Republic was ideologi-
cally founded by the intellectuals who 
were in same cases originated from 
Azerbaijan. The Soviet “parentheti-
cal” was not an obstacle to renewing 
the cultural and religious relations 
between the two countries when the 
Soviet Union collapsed. Turkish tele-
vision networks are avidly followed 
in Azerbaijan, and the similarity of 
the language is apparent in the streets 
of Baku. In the religious domain, 
Azerbaijani Shiism and Turkish Sun-
nism do not hinder cooperation be-
tween the two countries. The Turkish 
Religious Affairs Administration, 
“Diyanet,” cooperates with the Spiri-
tual Leader of Baku, and a number of 
Turkish Islamic movements are im-
planted in Azerbaijan, like the disci-
ples of Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan, or 
those of the mystic Nakshibendi Os-
man Nuri Topbas. Finally, in the area 
of education, there is the strong pres-
ence of the educational institutions 
set up by Fethullah Gulen. A number 
of his followers have set up universi-
ties as well as dozens of schools and 
exam preparatory schools.8 
Thus, relations between the two coun-
tries are excellent at all levels. They are 
grounded but it does not mean that 
Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan and 
İlham Aliyev, the 
Prime Minister 
of Azerbaijan in 
Baku, Azerbaijan.
AA / Vugar Ibadov
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certain tensions do not exist. In par-
ticular, when Ankara moves towards 
normalizing its relations with Arme-
nia, it meets with strong resistance 
from its Azerbaijani ally. The next 
section will demonstrate how Tur-
key’s foreign policy towards Armenia 
is decided, really, in Baku rather than 
in Ankara. 
Turkey-Armenia, an Impossible 
Reconciliation?
 
Relations between Turkey and Arme-
nia remain, to say the least, very del-
icate and complex, as history and the 
frozen conflict in the Nagorno-Kara-
bakh weigh heavily on the present. 
Turkey did recognize Armenia’s in-
dependence at the end of the Soviet 
era and considered establishing dip-
lomatic relations with Yerevan. How-
ever, these relations were short lived. 
In 1993, in solidarity with Azerbai-
jan, Turkey closed its borders with 
Armenia to protest against the occu-
pation of Karabakh and certain other 
Azerbaijani towns by the Armenian 
forces. Ever since, this cold conflict 
has been an insurmountable obstacle 
in the normalization of relations be-
tween the two countries and has had 
an impact on Turkey’s foreign policy 
in the Caucasus. 
The other thorny issue is the question 
of the Armenian genocide. Armenia 
qualifies the massacre of the Arme-
nian populations in 1915 under the 
Ottoman Empire as genocide and ac-
tively advocates in the international 
community to have it recognized as 
such.9 Turkey does not deny the mas-
sacres, but it contests the extent of the 
tragedy, which it argues took place in 
the context of the Russian-Turkish 
wars and these tragic events had an 
impact on all parties involved. 
Also, but none the less not a margin-
al issue, the exact demarcation of the 
border between the two countries is 
a subject of controversy. Turkey ful-
ly recognizes its actual borders, but 
Ankara still considers that Yerevan is 
ambiguous on this issue and has in-
vited it to clarify its position on the 
official border.10
Having been stuck in an impasse 
throughout the 1990s, relations with 
Armenia have improved since the AK 
Party came to power and introduced 
its foreign policy of “zero problems 
with neighbors.” Turkey has tried to 
improve its relations with all of its 
neighbors. The first steps were made 
in 2008, within the framework of 
“football diplomacy.” Taking advan-
tage of soccer matches between Tur-
key and Armenia in 2008 to qualify 
for the Euro Cup, President Abdul-
lah Gul and his counterpart, Serzh 
No longer having to 
serve the role of the 
buffer zone between 
East and West, Turkey 
aspires to become a 
major political actor 
and to impose itself 
on the regional scene 
in the post-Soviet era
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Sargsyan, held mutual visits. These 
visits, undoubtedly, opened the door 
for dialogue and other bolder initia-
tives. Secret negotiations led to the 
preparation of the “Negotiation of 
the Protocols” to normalize relations 
between Turkey and Armenia.”11 
However, these efforts, no matter 
how sincere they may have been, fell 
to the weigh side under the reaction 
and pressure coming from Azerbai-
jan, who accused Turkey of treason 
and trying to marginalize Baku from 
the negotiations, especially exclud-
ing the Nagorno-Karabakh from the 
equation. In retaliation, Azerbaijan 
threatened to increase the price of 
oil and other derivative products ex-
ported to Turkey. Azerbaijan even 
threatened to use Russia as a trans-
port route for oil and gas instead of 
Turkey.12 Thus, Azerbaijan’s leverage 
over Turkey compromised the suc-
cessful resolution of these Protocols 
and the revelations to the public of 
these secret talks forced the two par-
ties to retract themselves from pre-
vious positions, holding a much less 
conciliatory stance. In fact, the Pro-
tocols failed to obtain the approval of 
the two parliaments without which 
any normalization is impossible. 
However, this failure to achieve nor-
malization cannot be viewed as a total 
failure. The process allowed Turkish 
and Armenian negotiators to meet. It 
also encouraged civil society on both 
sides of the border to start a serious 
discussion and to reflect upon these 
painful topics. Initiated before these 
political discussions took place – the 
dialogue between historians, intel-
lectuals, and academics now is a new 
development and opens the door to 
many other initiatives. True, next 
year’s commemoration in 2015 of the 
hundred year old tragedy of 1915 risks 
polarizing the two camps but the first 
efforts of negotiations gives us hope 
that dialogue is possible. Indeed, in 
April 2014, the Turkish Prime Minis-
ter’s official expression of condolences 
for the descendants of the Armenian 
died in 1915 under Ottomans was a 
step forward in the rapprochement 
between Turkey and Armenia.13
Turkey and Georgia, the Bridge 
Between the Caspian and Europe
Turks and Georgians have a long 
common history marked by conflicts 
of bordering countries. The Ottoman 
Empire dominated for a longtime 
part of the current Georgian terri-
tory, notably the province of Ajaria, 
which was islamicized as of the 16th 
century. Despite this tumultuous 
past, the advent of an independent 
Georgia from the Soviet Union in 
1991 allowed a development of good 
relations between Ankara and Tbili-
si, which Turkey privileged for two 
reasons. First, for Turkey, the Geor-
gian territory is an entrance corridor 
to the Caucasus and Central Asia 
or Turkic World, beyond the Caspi-
an Sea.14 Second, Georgia possesses 
fundamental importance for Turkey 
since the hydrocarbons of the Cas-
pian Sea pass through the country to 
reach the Turkish ports and the inter-
national markets. 
Reciprocally, Turkey is a key country 
for Georgia for at least two reasons 
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as well. First, it is a window toward 
Europe for Georgia. Turkey’s nego-
tiations for EU membership are of 
great importance for Tbilisi, as it as-
pires to go beyond its own Caucasus 
enclave. Second, in the context of its 
conflictual relations with the other 
regional superpower, Russia, Georgia 
needs Turkey as a balancing power, in 
particular, to overcome its economic 
problems and counter the Russian 
markets, which have been closed to 
it since the war between Georgia and 
Russia in 2008. 
Thus, since their establishment in the 
early 90s, relations between Geor-
gia and Turkey have been warm and 
carefully maintained through regular 
mutual visits. The change of power 
that occurred with the Revolution of 
the Roses in 2003, and the failure at 
the ballot box for Saakashvili in Octo-
ber 2012 with the arrival to power of 
his rival Bidzina Ivanishvili only had 
a limited amount of repercussions on 
the good relations with Turkey. Still, 
these relations are sometimes diffi-
cult to manage for Turkey since the 
AKP came to power and established 
a rapprochement policy with Russia. 
Georgia’s pro-Western stance and 
its desire to enter NATO have ren-
dered Turkey’s dual attempt to have 
good relations with both Russia and 
Georgia difficult to navigate. Thus, in 
August 2008, when Russia invaded a 
part of Georgia, which was seeking 
to recuperate its secessionist prov-
ince of South Ossetia, Turkey found 
itself in a very awkward position. 
The diplomatic initiative to create the 
“Caucasus Stability and Cooperation 
Platform” by only grouping region-
al actors to manage regional prob-
lems, quickly showed the limitations 
of Turkey’s power in its immediate 
surroundings.15 
The generally good relations between 
Turkey and Georgia encounter on 
occasion minor tensions. The activ-
ism of the Abkhazia minority of Tur-
key regularly stirs up trouble, as they 
maintain commercial activities with 
Abkhazia. But this region of Geor-
gia is secessionist. As Tbilisi tries to 
quell the insurgency, it looks at the 
exchanges with Turkey with a critical 
eye, recognizing that they are out of 
its control. 
Meanwhile, there also exist some 
religious tensions between the two 
countries. Georgians, in particular 
the Georgian Church, which has 
seen an increasing political role over 
recent years, does not appreciate the 
religious activism of certain Turkish 
groups on its territory, in particular in 
Ajaria. More prosaically, the building 
of new mosques or the restoration 
of older ones abandoned during the 
Soviet era, which are financed by the 
The diplomatic initiative to 
create the “Caucasus Stability 
and Cooperation Platform” by 
only grouping regional actors 
to manage regional problems, 
quickly showed the limitations 
of Turkey’s power
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private initiatives of certain groups, 
like Suleyman Tunahan’s group, are 
badly perceived by certain segments 
of the population, who feel that their 
Christian identity is being threat-
ened. Similarly, Turkey is seeking to 
rebuild the Aziziye Mosque in Ba-
tumi, a vestige of the Ottoman past 
and domination of the region.16 To 
counterbalance and resolve these 
tensions, Turkey has offered to re-
store old Georgian Churches in Tur-
key. These cooperation efforts are 
continuing but their final outcome 
remains uncertain. Their success de-
pends on the strengthening of bilat-
eral relations. 
Finally, the question of Meshkete 
is divisive. The Meshketians, also 
known as the Ahiska, are a small 
Turkish minority from Georgia – de-
ported in 1944 from their villages in 
the steps of Central Asia. After the 
end of the Soviet era, similarly to a 
large number of peoples of the Cau-
casus, many who were deported are 
seeking to return to their homes. 
Supported by Turkey in their quest to 
return home, these numerous Mesh-
ketians have not obtained Tbilisi’s 
agreement to return to their lands, 
despite multiple promises. 
Overall, relations between Turkey 
and Georgia are very good. The de-
velopment of the pipeline projects, in 
particular the TAP and the TANAP 
will render the Turkish and Georgian 
economies even more complementa-
ry and interdependent. Similarly, the 
annexation of the Crimea by the Rus-
sians will most likely slow the prog-
ress of a renewal of Russian-Georgian 
relations, which Prime Minister Ivan-
ishvili had begun and will instead re-
inforce relations between Ankara and 
Tbilisi. 
Conclusion 
At the end of the Soviet era, the Cau-
casus and Central Asia have taken an 
important place in Turkey’s foreign 
policy. However, Ankara’s ambitions 
have been beyond its actual capaci-
ty for action. So, it has returned to a 
more pragmatic and realist posture. 
Consequently, Turkey’s foreign pol-
icy in this region has somewhat ne-
glected Central Asia but maintained 
a keen interest in the Caucasus, in 
particular, because of its importance 
in the energy sector. Furthermore, 
the diplomatic initiative of Foreign 
Minister Davutoğlu has it as a cen-
tral goal to better Turkey’s relations 
with its neighbors, and notably Ar-
menia. The normalization of its re-
lations with these countries remains 
one of Turkey’s priorities, not only 
for economic reasons but also for 
political and symbolic ones – as Tur-
key wants to appear as a country at 
peace with its neighbors. This situa-
tion has become ever more pressing 
in the Caucasus, as Turkey is trying 
not to become more embroiled in the 
Syrian civil war and also is seeing its 
relations with countries of the Middle 
East deteriorate. 
For Ankara, however, for its rela-
tions to improve with Armenia, the 
conflict of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
must be resolved. Thus, Turkey’s best 
bet for partnership in the region is 
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Azerbaijan. The conundrum is that 
Azerbaijan’s strategy is to isolate Ar-
menia. It won’t hesitate to block Tur-
key’s efforts towards Armenia and 
will use its energy ticket as a form of 
blackmail, taking Turkey as a “hos-
tage” in the process. Nevertheless, 
maintaining the status quo on the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict serves as 
a political lever for Baku in defense 
of its domestic and foreign interests. 
This situation, which looks like it 
may last, makes Baku the center of 
attention and decision making on a 
number of unavoidable issues in the 
region, including how Turkey can 
carry out its foreign policy in the 
South Caucasus.  
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